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1. INTRODUCTION
Christopher Sevier Esq., executive director of De Facto Attorneys General, Jolm Gunter
Jr., executive director of Special Forces Of Liberty M iam i Division, and Pastor Rich Penkoski,
executive director of W arriors For Cluist respectfully subm it this amicus brief on the narrow
issue of standing, given how the 'original complaint is pled.l rhe Amici partially support the
Plaintifs' case, but not necessarily under the current causes of action asserted in the original
complaint on certain conditions. On the surface, Plaintiffs' causes of action lmnecessarily puts
the judicial branch in a dimcult position by asking the Court to either (1) strike down or void 47
U.S.C. # 230 2 (which is generally Eçgood law'' but is undoubtedly being wrongfully abused by
1 The evidence shows that lawyers knowjust enough to be dangerous on any topic unless
they have litijated the issue. (See the stafl- lawyers who work for Governor Desantis, who wrote
587072 the b1l1 which created 9106.072, j 287.137, and j 501.2041). The Amici have litigated
Section 230 issues and social media censorship before a host of Federal Courts, but most
importantly, they have litigated the matter before countless legislative committees in the face of
robust opposition. '
(1) See the video of the hearing on the Social Media Censorship Act before the public
laws committee in M issouri, which included arguments from De Facto Attonwys General,
Google, and the Heartland lnstitute: (hûps://- .youtube.coe watch?N e4oW om Kzs)
(2) See the video of the hearing before the Commerce Committee in the Louisana
Senate with testimony by Senator M orris, De Facto Attom eys General, Netchoice
, and
@ûos:/- .voumbe.coe watch?e c-NqzhBco s&t=8s)
(3) See the video of the hearing before the Judiciary Committee in the Sute of Maine
with testim ony by Rep. Sampson and De Facto Attorneys General. '
(he s://- .youmbe.com/watch?v=p'l'z L1'nx-dE)
lt is in the wake of fighting in legislative committees ajainst their adversaries that the Amici have
been able to perfect the language of a proposed legislatlve instrum ent for a11 50 states entitled the
Stop Social M edia Censorship Act, a bill parallels the spirit of Section 230 and draws from it in
a manner so that the stamte will fall squarely in the state-law exemption under subsection (e)
subparagraph (3) of Section 230. (See Appendix A). The Stop Social Media Censorship Act is
not preempted by Federal 1aw and a cause of action brought under it, once enacted, will cut
through an immunity defense noated by social media websites that break their promises, deceive
consumers, and act in bad faith. At the 2021 lègislative session Rep. Sabatini introduced the
measure as HB 33,, which is referred to as the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act.
2 lf the Plaintifs want to ask a Court to strike down Section 230, the Plaintifs might need
to name the enforcer of Congress's laws as the defendant, not Twitter. The U .S. Congress created
Section 230, not Twitter. Perhaps if the Plaintifrs named the U.S. as the Defendant, the Plaintifs
would have colorable claim to have Section 230 struck down for violating the Eûright to reddress
grievence clause' or pétition and access clause of the FirstAmendment, if and only if the
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social media websites to pepetrate bad faith acts at the expense of a litany of fundamental
freedoms) or to (2) find that certain social media websites are quasi-state actors that are subject
to comply with First Amendment restrictions.3 W hile PlaintiFs' causes of action are not
necessarily invalid, they are seemingly weak, asking too muoh from the judicial branoh. But the
recent decision in Netchoice, LL C et al., M Moody et. al. 4:21cv220-RH-MAF (N.D.F.L
2021)(DE 113) changes everything. In the wake of the Netchoice decision, either (1) Section
230 is unconstimtional under the petition and aocess clause of the First Amendment or (2) the
Court must rule that Florida needs to pass a better law, like the amended version of HB 33, the
Stop Social M edia Censorship Act, by Rep. Sabatini and Sen. Gruters, that will allow consumers
''state-law exemption'' under subsection (e) subparagraph (3) doesn't allow for proposed shtutes
like the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act to stop the abusive misuse of Section 230 in the view
of verifiable injuries. Congress provided a way for an aggrieved individual to seek redress
through the state-law exemption. But not a single state has passed the Stop Social M edia
Censorship Act, which is a very narrowly tailored proposed state-statute that would allow for
aggrieved party to get reddress against the a social m edia website for the kinds of wrongdoing
inflicted on the Plaintiffs in this case by the Defendants. The evidence shows that if Section 230
was construed to preempt the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act, which is designed to protect
Florida consumers from fraud, breach of contract, and safeguard their free speech rights, it would
raise serious doubts about Section 230's constitutionality under the FirstAmendment under
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836 (2018) (discussing constitutional avoidance canon)
3 First Amendment says tçcongress'' shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech
or of the press. The Fourteenth Amendment extended this prohibition to state and local
governments. The First Amendment does not restrict the rights of private entities not performing
traditional, exclusive public functions. See, e.g., M anhattan Cza/y. Access Corp. M Halleck, 139
S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (2019). Some courts have found that private forums- however popular they
might be- are not state actors, and thus cannot violate anyone's First Amendm ent rights. See
Prager Univ. u Google L L C, 951 F.3d 991, 994 (9th Cir. 2020). Yet, the Plaintifs could argue
that Section 230 creates a broad law-free zone in which internet companies can censor however
they like, even in bad faith, raising serious questions whether their censorship constitutes state
action. See Skinner v. Ry. L ab. Execs. 'Ass 'n , 489 U.S. 602, 615 (1989) (Gnding state action
where the government idrem oved a11 legal barriers'' to private companies dnzg-testing their
employees and çtmade plain . . . its strong preference for testingn). If total immunity exists then,
Section 230 would create Kta suY ciently close nexus between'' Congress and social-media
platforms engaged in censorship to support a flnding of sute action. Jackwn u M etro. Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974). This analysis is powerfully reinforced by the history of the First
Am endment, for censorship by nominally private actors with monopoly power over an important
form of communication was the precise evil that the founding generation had in mind when the
First Amendment was ratifed. See Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516, 526- 27 (4th Cir. 2003)
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like the Plaintifs to obtain relief when they are the victims of deceptive trade practices,
fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, unjust enrichment, false advertising, and deceptive
trade practices. The Amici believe that the Court should find that the Stop Social M edia
Censorship Act is the Eçcure-all'' to the litany of competing problems presented in this ongoing
controversy and that the state-law exemption under subsection (e) subparagraph (3) is the saving
grace, while advising that if Florida wants to protect consumers like the PlaintiFs it should enact
the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act.
By permitting the Amici to subm it this brief, perhaps all parties and this Honorable Court
will better understand the complex issues involved that will help a1l interested parties in the
adjudication of these proceeding, while penuitting the Court to reach the best outcome in the
interest of justice in a manner that does not offend the rule of 1aw or hurt the public's welfare.
The bottom-line is that either this Court needs to acknowledge that Florida needs to pass a better
law like the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act, HB 33 in its am ended form, or the Court needs
to rule Section 230 of the Comm unications Decency Act unconstitutional for constituting
Congressional action that violates the petition and access clause of the First Amendm ent of the
United States Constitution. Those are the only two legally cognizable options.
II. TIIE LEGISLATW E HISTORY AND PROCEDURAI, HISTORY OF OF THE STOP
SOCIAL M EDIA CENSORSHIPACT. SB 7072.AND RELEVANT CASES
Here is a breakdown of the relevant legislative and procedural history concerning this
case. In 2019, the Amici convinced Sen. Gruters to draft and introduce the Stop Social M edia
Censorship Act. I'he bill was reintroduced at the 2020 legislative session by Sen. Gruters and
Rep. Sabatini.4 In 2021, Rep. Sabatini introduced the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act
(HB33), and subsequently, for unknown reasons, Rep. Sabatini got into some kind of squabble
4 See the press conference with Laura Loomer:
h=ps://- .facebook.com/watch/1ive/?v=907548599640066&ref=watch oermalink)
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with Speaker Sprowls, as passions do tend to nln high in the legislative branch
, unlike in the
cooler judicial one. This dust-up caused the members of the Florida House to oppose Rep.
Sabatini's bills simply because of dswho he was'' and not because of tsthe m eritorious substance of
his bills.' In the wake of the Sabatini/sprowls squabble, Governor Desantis got his staffto use
the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act as a prelim inary foundation to draft the monstrosity that
became SB 7072. SB 7072 was undoubtedly perverted by ambitions and legal ignorance issues
at hand. On M ay 24, 2021, SB 7072 was enacted and set to go into effect in early July. In early
June, Netchoice and others filed a lawsuit to stop the state from enforcing the statm es. See
Netchoice, LL C et a1., v. Moody et. al. 4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF (N.D.F.L 2021). On June 30,
2021, the court in Netchoice granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin
Florida state omcials from enforcing parts of SB 7072. (DE 113). On July 7, 2021, the Plaintiffs,
here, filed the instant case but did not include a cause of action under state statute written to fall
within the state-law exemption of Section 230.5 The Amici now request leave to have this brief
docketed. The Amici will immediately file a separate lawsuit of their own on the same exact
issues before the District Court in the Southern District, attacking this issue from diflkrent angles
than the Plaintifs, naming the U.S. Attorney General as the defendant. Having authored the
5 The evidence shows that President Trump - alone - has the leadership skills to sort this
out. The Amici are calling upon President Trump to lean on his connections with Governor
Desantis to call a special session pursuant to Article 111, Section 3, of the Florida Constitution to
enact the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act in its amended form : see Appendix B. The Amici
are then recomm ending that the Plaintiffs amend their complaint to include a cause of action
under the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act. President Trump should remind Governor of
Florida, Speaker Sprowls, and Rep. Sabatini of the Reagan principle that çdthere is no limit to the
amount of good you can do if you don't care who gets the credit.' President Trump should be
advised that if he gets Florida to call a special session and pass the Stop Social M edia Censorship
Act, then he can rest assured that virtualy a1 of the states will pass the Stoy Social Media
Censorship Act out of the gate at the 2022 legislative session. (See Appendlx A). Even if
President Tnzmp does not take this recommended course of action, the Amici will all but ensure
that countless states will enact the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act at the inception of the 2022
legislative session.
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Stop Social M edia Censorship Act for al1 50 states, the Amici have a special interest in the
outcome of this case.6 The Amici àre working in over 37 states on this issue before the state
legislatures. (See Appendix A). While the Amici appreciate Florida's initiative on this topic,
Florida cannot be allowed to muck it up for the rest of the nation. No matter what, the evidence
shows that the days of social media tyranny are going to end.
111. IDENTIFYING THE BEST COURSE OFACTION FOR THE PLM NTIFFS TO
TAKE
6 The Amici consists prim arily of Christ-followers, who served in the United Sutes
M ilitary in foreign theaters of war, namely on the rule of 1aw mission, which is purposed to
better ensure a government's compliance with their highest Constimtional authority. The Amici
have continued that m ission state-side in America even though they no longer ofticially
operating under Title 10 jurisdiction on behalf of the Armed Forces. The Amici routinely 5le
comprehensive lawsuits across the United States on diflkrent controversial and complex issues
that typically concern the çtculture wars' and First Amendment issues that are too Gçpolitically
hot' for the government-funded Attorneys General to pursue. ln bringing such lawsuits
, the
Amici - without apology - often end up converting Article I1I Courts into their own private
legislative research commission. Out of the overflow of the litigation ptlrsued by the Amici, the
Amici subsequently draft legislation for a11 50 states and for the federal government, which is
then routinely introduced by a bi-partisan network of sponsors that stretches across the Country
before the Article I branch. The legislation authored by the Amici that gets presented to the
members of legislative branch is legaly veted ad nausem and is calculated to survive judicial
review, if subsequently challenged once enacted.
One of the tights that the Amici have undertaken in multitudes of Federal District Courts
concerns Big Tech censorship, since this fght has created a freedom crisis that is eroding the
quality of life for millions of Americans. Subsequently, the Amici authored a proposed bill
called the 'sstop Social M edia Censorship Act'' that is custom ized for al1 50 states and is
narrowly tailored to parallel the spirit of Section 230 of the CDA so that it falls squarely in the
state-law exemption under subsection (e) subparagraph (3) of the Section 230 - thereby getting
around the problem of preemption. Here is a website for the bill:
htps://- .specialforcesoiibeo .com/. Here is a shol't video that the Amici provide to
state legislam res who prime sponsor, co-sponsor, or support the bill so that they can easily
understand the bill and the issues involved: @tps'.//youO.be/CCcOAL> teM).
Over 25 states moved on two prim ary bills written to stop the on-going problem of sooial
m edia censorship that were drafted by either De Facto Attorneys General or Professor
Hamburger of Columbia Lawschool. Countless Republicans and Democrats prime sponsored,
co-sponsored, or supported these legislative measures. For a breakdown by state and by prim e
sponsor for the 2021 lejislative session and the 2022 legislative session of the proposed language
of the bills see Appendlx A .
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President Trump likes to win. So do the Amici. lf Plaintifrs wànt to prevail in this legal 4
) 6I 
1 . I1 r1 1..:
fght, notjust making a political statement, they should take the following steps:
(1) seek leave to temporarily hold these proceedings in abeyance or delay serving process
on the Defendants pursuant to FRCP 4;
(2) President Trump should use his personal conneotions to press Governor Desantis to
immediately hold a special session pursuant to Article 111, Section 3,7 of the Florida Constimtion
,
to pass the amended version of 11833, 8 the Sdstop Social Media Censorship Act'' (a narrowly
tailored state bi-partisan statute that parallels the spirit of Section 230 and was intentionally
created to fall in the state-law exemption under subjection (e) subparagraph (3) of Section 230,
that over 25 states introduced this past session, and that does not suffer from the same overt
problems presented by Senate Bill 7072))
(3) after the Stop Social Media Censorship Act is enacted, the Plaintiffs should then
reopen this case, am end their original complaint pursuant to FRCP 15 et. seq, as a matter of
course, to include a cause of action under the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act
, which will not
be preempted under the doctrine of preemption, cutting through any Section 230 immunity
defense - thereby having the potential to solve this ongoing bi-partisan problem for the whole of
the Nation, accomplishing the Plaintifrs paramount objective; 9
7 In view of the recent decision in Netchoice, LL C et al., v. M oody et. al.
4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF (N.D.F.L 2021), Governor Desantis has a duty pursuant to his oath of
office undertaken pursuant to clause 3 of Article V1 of the United States Constitution to call a
special session under Article 111, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution to enact the Stop Social
M edia Censorship Act to cure the Constitutional defects presented in 587072.
8htps://- .dropbox.com/s+65u> s2n(48V2022%20F1orida%20Stop%20Socia1%20
M edia%20Censorship%20Act%20A> NDED.pdOd1=0
9 If the Plaintiffs undertake this suggested course of action - getting Florida to enact the
Stop Social M edia Censorship Act and then amending the complaint to include a cause of action
under that statute - then this Court would retain jurisdiction over these proceedings under
diversity questionjurisdiction because the parties are diverse and the amount in controversy is
more than $75,000. 28 U.S. Code j 1332. Fraud, false advertising, breach of contract, bad faith,
unfair dealing are not protected foz'm s of speech for purposes of the First Amendm ent, and the
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(4) the Plaintifrs should also amend their original complaint to include a cause of action
for false advertising under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. jj 1051 et seq, which is not preemption
by section 230 and which will confer Federal Questionjurisdiction on this Court;
(5) If Govemor Desantis' refuses to call a special session underArticle 111, Section 3, to
enact the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act for whatever reason, thc Plaintifs should amend
their complaint and include a cause of action under j 501.2041(6)10 which may still be alive and
found to fall in the state-law exelhption under 47 U.S.C. j 230(e)(3) by this Court;
(6) 'I'he Plaintifrs should amend their complaint and fsle a cause of action under Florida's
existing deceptive trade practice law, which the Court m ight also fall in the state-law exemption
under section 230.
VI. ARGUM ENT
A. W hat Is The Best Solution To This Oneoine Bi-nartisan Problem ?
state of Florida has a narrowly tailored compelling public interest to deter those forms of harmful
unprotected speech to protect consumers from  the kinds of abuses that the Plaintifs have
experienced. But because the Doctrine of preemption under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constimtion might allow the Defendants to currently invoke blanket immunity under
Section 230 - a federal 1aw - the Plaintifs need a sure fire way around this immunity defense.
Fortunately, Congress already built into Section 230 exemgtions where Section 230 immunity
defense could not be successfully invoked by internet provlders. If the State of Florida would
enact the Stop Social Media Censorshiy Act - unmolested by petty politics and self-interests -
then the PlaintiFs will prevail heie, taklng a massive step towards combating the epidemic of
censorship that has cultivated a threat to election integrity and a litany of fundamental freedoms
that undermine our citizens rightlto pursue life
, liberty, and hapiness.
10 FRCP 8(e)(2) allows for a plaintiffs to plead inconsistent and altemative claims.- so the
PlaintiFs could ask the Court to either (1) 1et them enforce Sec. 501.2041(6) or to (2) render
Section 230 unconstimtional in view of Judge Hinkle's decision in Netchoice, LL C et al., u
Moody et. al. 4:21cv220-R1-1-MU  (N.D.F.L 2021). Sec. 501.204146), part of SB 7072, creates a
private right of action: any Guser'' may sue if she (1) believes moderation standards were not
applied çtin a consistent manner' or (2) did not receive the required notice following a
moderation action. Courts may award up to $100,000 in statutory damages per violation, plus
actual and potentially punitive dàmages. Id. While Judge Hinkle granted a preliminary injuction
against Florida state actors in Netchoice, LL C et al., v. M oody et. al. 4:21cv220-R11-M M
(N.D.F.L 2021) when it comes to enforcing SB 7072, this does not necessarily mean that the
injunction extends to private citizens like the Plaintiflk. n erefore, the Plaintifs could include a
cause of action under Sec. 501.204146). But there is no doubt that the Stop Social Media
Censorship Act is a vastly superior 1aw for a host of reasons discussed throughout this brief.
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The ultimate question presented is what is the best solution to the ongoing bi-partisan
problem of social media censorship? Is it (a) &Gan executive order by the President?'' or (b) <dto
have the judicial branch decree that social media websites are quasi-state actors for purposes of
the FirstAmendment?' or (c) tçthe striking down Section 230 byjudcial action or the total repeal
of Section 230 by Congressional responsivenessT'; or (d) $%o do nothing, alowing the status quo
of abuse to continue in total disregard of the Petition and Access Clause?'' or (e) Gto allowing
censored litigants to successfully bring a cause of action pursuant to a sotmd narrowly tailor state
statute that wil alow injured consumers to punish social media websites for having engaged in
self-evident unprotected harmful forms of speech and practices to include: (1) breach of contract,
(2) false advertising, (3) deceptive trade practices, (4) bad faith, (5) unfair dealing, (6) unjust
enrichment, and (7) fraudulent inducement?' The best solution to this problem is unequivocally
the isfth option - option (e). This is because already built into section 230 is the ftstate-law
exemption' under subsection (e) subparagraph (3). 11Put simply, this Court should ultimately
indicate that Flùrida made a mistake in enacting SB 7072, when it should have enacted the
amended version of 10 33.12 If this Court does not m ake that finding
, then some logically
1 W hen Congress passed section 230 they included exception provisions for when a
section 230 immunity defense could not be successfully invoked by an internet intermediary, like
the Defendants, under subsection (3). While the Plaintiffs filed a federal question lawsuit that
asks the Court to hold that tlw Defendants' conduct and the validity of Sec'tion 230, in view of
the First Am endment of the United States Constitution, the PlaintiFs would dram atically
increase their chances of success if they would amend their complaint to include at least one
cause of action under a state statute that would fall in the state-law exemption.
12 President Trump should (1) hold these proceedings in abeyance; (2) press Governor
Desantis to hold a special session to pass the amended version of 11833 by Rep. Sabatini and
Sen. Gruters referred to as the Estop Social M edia Censorship Act''
(hûps://- .dropbox.com/s+65u> s2nf148F2022%20Florida%20Stop%20Social%20Media%
20Censorshio%20Act%20AMENDED.DdOd1=0) (3) amend the original complaint to include
this new cause of action to include a cause of action brought under the Stop Social M edia
Censorship Act. Florida passed j 106.072, j 287.137, and j 501.2041 this session - three
statutes that were initially based on the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act until political
Case 1:21-cv-22441-RNS   Document 17   Entered on FLSD Docket 07/19/2021   Page 13 of 39
consistent Federal court in one of the other 11 Circuits likely will, permitting Section 230 to be
stnzck down completely in view of the Netchoice decision. This will start a causal chain that will
cultivate additional problems thqt are diferent but perhaps not quite as bad as allowing social
media websites to operate under total immunity.
B. How Did W e Get Here - Understanding The Current Landscape And The M isuse
Of Section 230
n e evidence shows that the decision in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodiu  Services Co.,
1995 WL 323710, at *3-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) in part 1ed to the creation of Section
230.13 The Amici
, unlike the Plaintiffs, contend that there are valid uses of Section 230 that
should remain in p1ace.14 However, what has been happening to the Plaintifs, the Amici, and
ambition corrupted the process, causing the three statutes created by 587072 for failing to
survive heightened scrutiny.
13 In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. M Prodiv  Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, at *3-4 @ .Y Sup.
Ct. May 24, 1995), an anonymous user posted allegedly defamatory content on an electronic
bulletin board- an earlier version of what today might be called social media. n e court said that
if the provider of such a bulletin board did not undertake to review posted content- much as a
librarian does not undertake to review a1l the books in a library- the provider would not be
deemed the publisher of a defamatory post, absent sumcient actual knowledge of the defamatory
nature of the content at issue. On the facts of that case, though, the provider undertook to screen
the posted content- to maintain a Gfam ily-orientedi' site. 'I'he court held this subjected the
provider to liability as a publisher of the content. At least partly in response to that decision,
which was deemed a threat to development of the internet, Congress enacted 47 U .S.C. j 230.
The Stop Social Media Censorship Act does not subject computer services to tort liability for
passively hosting content postedlby others but seeks to empower users by limiting how content
may be censored. See 47 U.S.C. j 230(b)(2) (describing congressional purpose to ensure that
users retain Gça great degree of control over the information that they receive'')
14 Preliminarily, Section 230 should be explained so that a tifth-grader can understand it.
Basically, Section 230 was a federal statute created by Congress, not Twitter, in 1996 that was
part of the Communications Decency Act (CDA). The Communications Soecency'' Act was
designed to promote tçdecent' speech, not the Gçdeceptive trade practices' that the Defendants
have engaged in causing the direct injury of the Plaintils and the Amici. Section 230 allows for
certain intem et intermediaries to 'invoke an immunity defense for the harmful acts of third
parties, if and only itl the internet intermediary was not acting as a publisher/speaker/common
carrier to a certain arbikary and hard to determine degree. So, since that explanation is still
confusing and since trying to detçrmine whether a platform provider was a speaker, publisher
, or
common carrier tends to be a linguistic nightmare, the best way for anyone to understand a valid
Section 230 im munity defense is through the following example: GGlf a Floridian maliciously
posts a defamatory comm ent on Twitter against a person from New York, the New Yorker who
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m illions of Am ericans, who are b0th registexed Dem ocrat and Republican, is that social m edia
websites have been arbitrarily censoring thçir speech when it oFends the delicate sensibilities of
the employees who happen to work at the social media website at that time. W hen censored
individuals 5le a lawsuit against the social media website for such injurious wrongdoing, the
social media defendants invariably make the same questionable argument that they were Kmerely
engaging in general editorializing and should not be held liable in view of the Section 230
immtmity shield.'' So far in such cases, the courts have reluctantly allowed the social m edia
defendants to barely escape liability, like a manjumping through thmes. See 1 Corinthians 3:15.
In rendering such decisions, the courts have been hinting that if the state legislamre was to enact
a statute that was (1) narrowly tailored, (2) consistent with the spirit of Section 230, and (3)
intentionally designed to fall in the state-law exemption, then such a cause of action would
successfully pierce through a Section 230 im munity defense. The Stop Social M edia Censorship
Act - a state statute - is the answer that everm ne is looking for whether they realize it or not.15
C. The Stop Social M edia Censorshin Act Is The Cure-all In View Of The SiEnillcant
State-law Exem ption Alreadv Built Into Section 230 Bv Coneress
There is no need to throw the baby out with the bathwater in doing away with Section
I l1 i1 '21 -,u
230 in view of the state-law exemption and the potential passing of the Stop Social M edia
Censorship Act. 47 U.S.C. j 230(e)(3). Again to reiterate, this Court must either declare that
was defam ed could legitim ately sue the Floridian for defamation. However, if the N ew Yorker
nnmed Twitter as a co-defendant in the lawsuit, then Youmbe could successfully tsle a motion to
dism iss under FRCP 12 et. seq. invoking Section 230 immunity defense as the legal basis, and
legitimately have the lawsuit dismissed with prejudice against it'
That example involves a good use of Section 230 - showing that Section 230 is good law
- because Youmbe was merely acting as an innocent platform in that scenario. Therefore, the
Plaintifs demand that the Court completely skike down Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act should not be granted on the condition that the Court finds that the Social M edia
Censorship Act would survive judicial review if enacted.
15 A bill is just words on a pieçe of paper, and by enacting the Stop Social Media
Censorship Act, it will not necessarily help the Amici when it comes to credit and glory, but it
will help the Nation, and helping the Nation tlourish is the param ount mission of the Amici.
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Florida should have passed HR 33 over SB 7072 or render Section 230 tmconstimtional under
the petition and access clause of the First Am endmentl6 Any choice beyond that would be
intellectually dishonest. I'he Stop Social M edia Censorship Act is the escape hatch, built-in by
Congress in the statute itself. The EEstate-law exemption'' is the only provision of Section 230
that speaks dkectly to the relatiohship between this federal statute and state law expresjly
preserves the states' authority to Ktenforclej any State 1aw that is consistent with this section.' 47
U.S.C. j 230(e)(3). In fact, the wording of this provision which is expressly tied to particular
actions ççenforcing'' acts like the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act fz--disfavors preemption
challenges in a pre-enforcem ent posture. ln conform ity with that provision and tlw
well-established presumption against preemption, this Court should construe the rest of Section
230 narrowly and in a manner that allows federal and state law in this area to coexist. In doing
so, this Court should fsnd that the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act, if enacted, would neatly
fall within the state-law exemptiön and that if Florida wants to protect consumers like the
Plaintifrs, then it should enact the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act sooner rather than later.
lf, however, the Stop Social Vedia Censorship was fotmd to be unconstitmional or
preempted by Section 230, as was seeming the case with 587072, then a serious First
Amendment challenge to Section 230 would exist under C/ Agencyfor 1nt 1 Dev. v. All.for Open
Soc 1y Int 'l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 214 (2013) (discussing when conditions on federal funding
16 In creating this ççbroad federal immunity'' in passing section 230
, Almeida u
Amazon.com, lnc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2016), Congress gave statutory form to the
core FirstAmendment right to editorialjudgment. See Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 220
(5th Cir. 2016), but Congress cannot have legithnately done that by totally blocking access to
petition against obvious grievances without violating the First Amendm ent. W hile Federal law
preempts sàte tmder the Supremacy Clause, the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution preempts and outranks Federal laws, like Section 230, that violate the petition and
access clause. The Amici believe that the state-law exemption provides the only way around this
dilemma. The Stop Social Media Censorship Act is not just the best solution to this problem, it is
the only solution to stop Section 230 from being completely struck down.
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tçresult in an unconstitutional burden on First Amendment rights''). Accordingly, the courts
should not lightly conclude that Congress made a law that not only allows unbridled censorship,
but also prevents states from doing anything about it. The States have an ongoing compelling
interest to protect their citizens in step with their police powers under the Tenth Am endment of
the United States Constitution from fraud, deceptive trade practices, breach, bad faith, etc - none
of which is protected speech for purposes of the First Amendm ent.
D. Comparine The Differences Bqtween HB 33. the Stop Sqcial M edia Censorship Act &
SB 7072
Never since the inception of American jmisprudence has a plaintifbrought a lawsuit
under a state statute and argued that the Section 230 immunity defense could not be successfully
invoked because the lawsuit was filed tmder a stamte that fell within the state-law exemption,
piercing through the Section 230 immunity defense. Yet, when comparing the Stop Social M edia
Censorship Act to SB 7072, the Amici somewhat agree with Judge Hinkle's sentiment that the
Sistatutes Ecreated by 587072) are not narrowly tailored' and might constitute an dtinstance of
burning the house to roast a pig.' See Netchoice, L L C et al., v. M oody et. al.
4:21cv220-RH-MAF (N.D.F.L 2021) (page 27 of DE 113). See also, e.g., Reno M American
Civil L iberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 882 (1997,); Sable Commc 'n ofcal., lnc. v. FCC, 492 U.S.
115, 131 (1989). It would be more accurate to say that striking down Section 230 of the CDA
completely as the Plaintiffs' request would be an Ginstance of burning the house to roast a pig''
when the Stop Social Media Censorship Xct is obviously the cure-all from the perspective of any
reasonable observer to this ongoing dilemma because it falls squarely in the state-law exemption.
There are several diflkrences between the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act and SB
7072 that should be identi/ed. First, 587072 is vague and the Stop Social M edia Censorship
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Act is not.17 1dA fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or
entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.' FCC u Fox Tvstations,
Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 253 (2012). T'he Stop Social Media Censorship Act is not vague whatsoever
in view of its ten legislative fndings, the purpose section, and the straightfol-ward structure of the
language. The legislative findings of the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act spell out the
legislative intent in a comm on sense marmenl' Furthermore, the purpose and legal fram ework of
17 ç1(A)n enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.'
Grayned v. City ofRockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). To pass muster, laws must ttgive the
person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited'' and prevent
ldarbitrary and discriminatory enforcement' by dsprovidling) explicit standards for those who
apply them.'' Id.; accord Wollschlaeger v. Governor, 848 F.3d 1293, 1320 (11th Cir. 2017).
Although greater clarity is necessary when a stamte regulates expression, (dperfect clarity and
precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity,''
Ward v. RockAgainst Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989); see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110
(ççcondemned to the use of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our
language.''). Furthermore, tthe mere fact that close cases can be envisioned'' does not tlrenderl) a
statute vague.'' Unitedstates v. M lliams, 553 U.S. 285, 305 (2008).
18 The legislative sndings of the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act are as follows:
W HEREAS, the Communications Decency Act was created to protect decent speech, not
deceptive trade practices, and
REAS, repealing section 230 of the Communications Decency Act at the federal
level is unnecessary because it already includes a state-law exemption and the Stop Social M edia
Censorship Act was craûed to fall squarely in the state-law exemption of section 230 to cure
abuses of section 230 to protect the consumers of this state, and
W HEREAS, contract law is a state-law issue, and when a citizen of this state signs up to
use certain social media websites, they are entering into a contract, and
W HEREAS, this state has a compelling interest in holding certain social media websites
to higher standards for having substantially created a digital public square through fraud, false
advertising, and deceptive trade practices, and
WHEREAS, major social media websites have engaged in the greatest bait and switch of
a11 times by marketing themselves as free, fair, and open to a11 ideas to induce subscribers only to
then prove othelw ise at great expense to consumers and election integrity, and
W HEREAS, breach of contract, false advertising, bad faith, unfair dealing, fraudulent
inducem ont, and deceptive trade pradices are not protected forms of speech for purpose of the
Grst amendment of the United States Constitm ion or the Constitution of this state
, and
WHEREAS, the major social media websites have already reached critical mass, and they
did it through fraud, false advertising, and deceptive trade practices at great expense to the
health, safety, and welfare of consumers of this state, while making it diffcult for others to
compete with them , and
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the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act is crystal oltar, whereas the purpose of 587072 is not
.
The purpose section of the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act states:
This section is intended to create a statute that parallels the spirit of 47 U .S.C. j 230 that
falls within the state 1aw exemption under 47 U.S.C. 5 230(e)(3) and create a civil right
of action that will deter the following: (1) Deceptive trade practices; (2) False
advedising; (3) Breach of contract; (4) Bad faith; (5) Unfair dealing; (6) Fraudulent
inducement; andt7) The stifling of political and religious speech in the modern-day
digital public square cultivated by social media websites that have achieved critical mass
through fraud.
The pum ose of the Stop Social M edia Censoxship Act is to parallel the goals and spirit of Section
230 so that the state statute threads the needle and unquestionably falls within the state-law
exemption of Section 230 in a way that 587072 fails to do so.
Second, unlike with SB7072, the language of the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act and
Section 230 are parallel and identical in some respects. For example, 47 U.S.C. j 230(c)(2)(A)
states that an interactive computer service, like the Defendants, cannot be Slheld liable'' on
acoount of dlany action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of
material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected.' Sim ilarly, the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act sutes that social media websites
that are subject to the act cannot be held liable if they censor content that:
1. Calls for im mediate acts of violence; 2. ls obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or
pornographic in nature; 3. Is the result of operational error; 4. Is the result of a court
order; 5. Comes from an inauthentic source or involves false personation; 6. Entices
WHEREAS, the state has an interest in helping its citizens enjoy their free exercise rights
in certain semi-public forums comm only used for religious and political speech, regardless of
which political party or religious organization they ascribe to, and
W HEREAS, this statq is generally opposed to online censorship unless the content is
injurious to children or promotes human traxcking; only then does this state accept limited
censorship, and
W HEREAS, this act is not intended to apply to a website that merely deletes com ments
posted by members of the general public in response to material published by the website's
OW ner,
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criminal conduct; 7. Involves minors bullying minors; 8. Constitutes trademark or
copyright infringement; 9. Is excessively violent; and 10. Constitutes harassing spam of
the comm ercial, not religious or political, nature.
Because the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act neatly parallels the spirit and intent of Section
230, threading the needle in a way that SB 7072 does not. From every angle, it is clear that the
Stop Social Media Censorship Act has been crafted for al1 50 states in a manner that respects
federal law, while allowing the siate's consumers to be protected from deceptive trade practices.
Third. by framing the issues as breach of contract, bad faith, false advertising, unfair
dealing, unjust enrichment, deceptive trade practices, and consumer protection violations, the
Stop Social M edia Censorship Act fulfills a litany of compelling government interests in ways
that 587072 fails to do so. The Stop Social Media Censorship Act Gspromotegsq the widespread
dissem ination of information from a multiplicity of sources,'' an interest that the Supreme Court
in Turner had Eçno difficulty concluding' was Ran important governmental interest'' Turner
fmcz Sys., Inc. v. FCC ('6Turner '), 512 U.S. 622, 662.-63 (1994). Ensuring that the public Rhas
access to a multiplicity of information sources,'' the Supreme Court explained, çis a
governmental purpose of the highest order, for it promotes values central to the First
Amendment' 1é at 663. Furthermore, Florida has a substantial interest in protecting its residents
from unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce. See FLA. STAT. j 501.204; Ohralik u
Ohio State BarAss 'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978); Crellin Techs., Inc. u Equipmentlease Corp., 18
F.3d 1, 12 (1st Clr. 1994). Additionally, Florida also has a compelling interest in preserving the
democratic process and ensuring fair elections. Burroughs u Unitedstates, 290 U.S. 534 (1934);
Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1317 (11th Cir. 1986).
Fourth. by fram ing the issue às arising under breach of contract, bad faith, fraudulent
inducement false advertising, unjust enrichment principles, a social media website sued under
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the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act could not assert Gtgood faith'' protections under Section
230(c)(2)(A).19 Judge Hinkle seemed incapable of or unwilling to pick up on this critical factor in
Netchoice, L LC et al., v. M oody et. al. 4:21cv220-1111-M .M7 (N.D.F.L 2021).
Fifth, where 587072 construes social media websites as common carriers
,zo the Stop
Social M edia Censorship Act focuses m ore on consumer protection violations, existing torts, and
existing breach of contract principles. The Stop Social M edia Censorship treats social media
websites lQe any entity doing business in the state, and prevents the business from harming
consumers for engaging in fraud, breach, decetive practices, false advertising, etc. W hile the
Florida Legislature permissibly determined that the tGold rules'' applicable to common carriers
should be applied to the tnew circum stances'' of social media in 587072
, the Stop Social M edia
Censorship Act merely gets existing consumer protection laws and contract 1aw principles to
apply to the Eçnew circumstances' of social media, while invoking the state-law exemption
19 Section 230(c)(2)(A) does not provide blanket immunity. It only applies when an
interactive computer service acts in Ktgood faith.'' W hile the parameters of çgood faith'' immunity
under Section 230(c)(2)(A) are not necessarily well-deûned in the caselaw, courts might
ultimately conclude that a social m edia platform's acting diFerently than how it marked itself
and shiRing its standards is determinative as to whether the platform acted in çigood faith-'' See
Smith u Trusted Universal Standards in Elec. Transactions, .Jpr., 2010 W L 1799456, at *7
(D.N.J. May 4, 2020). ln Netchoice, LL C et al., M Moody et. al. 4:21cv220-R11-MM7 (N.D.F.L
2021), the court stated in its order granting a preliminary injunction that GGthe legislation compels
providers to host speech that violates their standards- speech they otherwise would not
host- and forbids providers from speaking as they otherwise would.'' But that court fails to
realize that the social m edia website providers shift those standards in bad faith in an arbikary
and dishonest marmer in total breach of how they marked themselves to the public to induce
reliance. That court also fails to realize that the providers invited, enticed, and induced members
of the public to speak out openly and freely on diFerent religious and political doctrines without
any threat of emotional or econom ic reprisal, only to then turn around and deploy a Slgotcha
gnme'' with the expectation of total immunity.
20 In Section 1 of 587072
, the Florida Legislature found that Ssgslocial media platforms
have become as important for conveyjng public opinion as public utilities are for supgorting
modern societyy' and they Gçhold a unlque place in preserving first amendm ent protectlons for a1l
Floridians and should be treated similarly to common caniers.'' SB 7072 5 145), 1(6). In fact, as
Justice Thomas recently explained, çGkiln many ways, digital platlbrms that hold themselves out
to the public resem ble traditional common carriers.' Biden v. Knight FirstAmend. Inst, 141 S.
Ct. 1220, 1224 (2021) (Thomas, J., conèurring)
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directly. See Parka u Alta Cal. Tel. Co., 13 Cal. 422, 422 (1859). Put simply, the Stop Social
Media Censorship Act does not ask the judicial branch to reinvent the wheel; it merely asks that
existing law be permitled to catch up to m odetw day technology to safeguard consumers and
election integrity in a manner that accords with the policing powers of the State.
Sixth, because the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act is framed on breach of contract,
tort, and consumer protection principles, jurisdiction for enactment and enforcement is not
Constitutionally probematic in view of the Ten Amendm ent of the United Sttes Constitution,
unlike with SB 7072.21
Seventh. perhaps the biggest distinction between the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act
and 587072 is that the Stop Social M edia Censorship only applies to social m edia websites that
have more than 75 million profile users that were never aY liated with any particular religious or
political party from their inception.zz A social media website that was ax liated with a religious
21 The state of Florida has the legal authority to enact the Stop Social M edia Censorship
and injured parties, like the Plaintiflk, have the right to enforce it under the long-arm stattlte. See
Fla. Stat. j 48.193. When the Plaintiffs signed up to use Facebook and Twitter, they entered into
a contract in Florida. One of the oldestjurisprudence is that iscontract law'' is a (çstate-law issue.''
States have paramountjurisdiction to enact statutes that place certain restrictions on contracts to
protect consumers from harm. Otherwise, all consumer protection laws and al1 products liability
laws could be declared to violate the First Am endment. Twitter reached into the state of Florida
and induced the Plaintiffs to sign up to use their services by a contract, which gives the state of
Floridajurisdiction to regulate those contracts. While it is an undisputed fact that a contract does
exist between the Defendants and the Plaintifs, the contract is only relevant for the purpose of
the state havingjurisdiction to regulate those contracts because the contract at issue is
undoubtedly a contract of adhesion. Twitter and Facebook have billions of subscribers, they
never had a realistio expectation that the Plaintifrs would employ lawyers to review their
contract. Therefore, the contract is a contract of adhesion. Accordingly, the specific terms of
the adhesion contract do not matter. Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 119, 126-27 (2d
Cir. 2012). However, what does matter is the fact that Twitter, Facebook, and Youtube have
conspired to falsely market themselves as being ttfree, fair, open to the public, and open to a11
religious and political ideas'' to induce reliance only to then break their promise and censor
certain users in bad faith. This is a problem of broken promises and lying out of the overtlow of
moral superiority complexes.
22 The reason why the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act only applies to social media
websites that have more than 75 m illion users is not to treat diflkrent potential speakers
differently. The reason for this threshold is because the purpose of Section 230 was to allow
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or political party can, therefore, continue to censor users at wi11.23 If from their inception
Facebook, Twitter, or Youtube had m arked themselves as being aligned with the Democrat Party
or with the licentious religion of secular humanism , then they would have a defense for the
removal of political and religious speech that does not happen to conform to their favored
religious and political worldview.z4 But those social media websites did not make such
aY liations known upfront causing a classic reliance and inducement problem. The Stop Social
M edia Censorship Act and the Lanham Act are both calculated to stop businesses from harming
consumers through broken promises, false advtrtisement, and fraud. The so-called distandards'
tloated by Facebook, Twitter, and Youtube have always been unclear, vague, and shifting,
constituting per se bad faith. R ile it is true that social media websites might be able $%o
establish standards of decency without risking liability for doing so,'' what they calmot do is to
websites on the internet to grow without the fear of certain liability. The evidence shows from
the reasonable observer perspective that a social m edia website that has over 75 m illion proGle
users has ttsuY ciently grown.'' Therefore, a statute, such as the Stop Social M edia Censorship
Act, that alows victims of the deceytive, fraudulent, and dishonest honest trade practices of
social media websites to acquire rellef against a social media provider with more than 75 million
subscribers is consistent with the spirit and çdgrowth goals'' of Section 230, which further causes
it to fall squarely in the state-law exemption. The 75 million threshold is not imposed to treat
smaller and larger social m edia websites difrerently. The threshold is included out of respect for
the doctrine of preemption so that the Stop Social Media Censorship Act will squarely fall in the
state-law exemption.
23 A Black Lives M atter social media website, a Christian social media website, a M uslim
social media website, an LGBTQ social media website could censor any profle user who
opposed their fundamental doctrine and not be subjected to liability under the Stop Social Media
Censorship Act.
24 The United States Supreme Court found that Secular Humanism is a religion for the
purposes of the First Amendment Establishment Clause in Torcaso v. Watkins, 361 U.S. 488
(1961); School District ofA Bington Townsh+, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963);
United States v. Seeger, 380 US 163, 166 (1965); and Welsh v. Unitedstates, 398 U.S. 333
(1970). Most of the Federal Court of Appeals have found that Secular Humanism is a religion in
cases such as: (A) Malnak v. Fogf, 592 F. .2d 197, 200-15 (3d Cir.1979); Theriault v. Silber, 547
F.2d 1279, 1281 (5th Cir.1977); Thomas &! Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67
L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); L indell v. Mccallum, 352 F.3d 1107, 1110 (7th Cir.2003); Rcal
Alternatives, Inc. v . Secy Dep 't ofHea1th (f7 Human Servs., 150 F. Supp. 3d 419, 2017
WL3324690 (3d Cir. Auj. 4, 2017), and Cir. 2001); and Wels v. City and Cozln/y ofDenver, 257
F.3d 1132, 1148 (10th Clr. 2001).
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change those standards arbitrarily after they induced billions of people to subscribe and invest in
user profiles, having relied on the fact that the social m edia websites marketed them selves as
free, fair, open to the public, and neutral towards political and religious speech. See Domen v.
nmeo, Inc., 991 F.3d 66, 73 (2d Cir. 2021). The court in Netchoice, LL C et al., v. Moody et. al.
4:21cv220-RH-MAF (N.D.F.L 2021) failed to pick up on the critical factor that Facebook,
Twitter, and Youtube arbitrarily changed their standards in bad faith a11 the tim e, after
fraudulently inducing billions of people to subscribe and invest in their service at great personal
expense to them selves, their families, and their communities. That court ignored the shifting
standards completely, shrugging it ofl- in callous disregard.
In sum, this controversy is just about making the mega social media websites keep their
promises to consumers. The goal of the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act is not to punish
disfavored, out-of-state businesses and to stop or deter them from exercising their First
Amendment rights in ways the Amici dislikes. The goal is to force certain social media websites
to honor their promises and to live up to the way that they marketed themselves from their
inception in order to induce reliance. Social media websites like Twitter marked themselves as
being neutral on religion and politics, and they should be legally forced to remain so despite the
unwarranted intlated view that the employees who work there aaogantly harbor for themselves.
E. The First Am endment Is On The Side Of The Stop Social M edia Censorship Act
The First Amendm ent com bined with the state's inherent policing powers to protect
consumers from fraud are the underlying legal basis supporting the Stop Social M edia
Censorship Act. The state of Florida has a narrowly tailored compelling interest to pass the Stop
Social M edia Censorship Act in order to protect the varying religious and political views of their
citizens from deceptive censorship trade practices because the Defendants, Youtube, and
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Facebook have set out to create a digital public square and they have successfully done so
through fraud. Attorney General Barr called the concerted deceptive efrorts of the major social
m edia websites the greatest Csbait and switch' of a1l time.25 The PlaintiFs should press the State
of Florida to enact the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act because the State of Florida has a
narrowly tailored oompelling interest to ensure that its citizens a11 across the political and
religious spectrums are permitted to share their views in what amounts to as the modern-day
digital public square.26 The Stop Social M edia Censorship Act is not about helping Democrats or
Republicans or about putting one religion over another. It is about making social m edia websites
that marked themselves as being neutral on issues of religion and politics to be just that.
Democrats in Hawaii, Rhode lsland, and New York are the prime sponsor of the Stop Social
M edia Censorship Act because this is a bi-partisan problem.
Vk CONCLUSION.
This Court must either find that in order to prevaii the Plaintiffs must proceed under a 1aw
like the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act or that Twitter cannot invoke Section 230 as a defense
in view of the petition and access clause of the First Amendm ent.
zshlps://- .rawstov .coe zozo/osl arr-blasts-social-medias-bait-and-switch-u d-censo
rship-as-tO mp-suggests-hed-shut-dou -> iûer/
26 As the Suprem e Court has said, tthe vast dem ocratic fonlm s of the Internet, and social
m edia in particular' have become lthe most important places . . . for the exchange of views.''
Packingham u North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (cleaned up). According to the Pew
Research Center, 71% of Americans get news from social m edia. App.534. lt is not surprising
then that news publishers feel (sincreasingly beholden'' to digital platforms. App.90.
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1. Alabama - Drafted as follows for the 2022 legislative session:
hûDs://- .&opbox.co* s/mh0% mi8s9bZso/2022%20M AB> A%20STOP%20S0CIM %2
OM EDIA%ZOCENSORSHIP%ZOAM ENDED%ZOFW AL.DdOdI=O
2. Alaska. Drafted by Senator Showers (R) for introduction at the 2022 legislative session:
h=ps.'//- .dropbox.co* s/ci7c8x9r10J'b55F20220/c20A1aska0%20Stop0A20Socia10/o20M edia0/o2
0CensorsMp%20Act%20> ENDED%20FW AL.pdOdl=0
3-Arizona. 581428 sponsored by Sen. Townsend (R) - provided by De Facto Attorneys
General - at the 2021 legislative session:
hdos://1eqisc= .co* M /texVSB1428/2021
-Amended for 2022 legislative session to be inkoduced by Sen. Townsend:
hûps://- .dropbox.coe s/7ioiA b3z4toleR/zozz%zoo izona%zostop%zosocial%zoM edia%
zocensorshl'polzosnal.pdodl=o
4. Arkansas. Drafted by Chairman Sen. Clark (R) to be introduced at the 2023 legislative
session:
httos://- .droobox.coY s/og8Anllvzge v/zoz3%zoO kr sas%zostop%zosocial%zoM edia
%20CensorsED%20Act%20O NDED%20%281%29.pdOd1=0
!. California. In review by Sen. Grove to be introduced at the 2022 legislative session as
follows:
hûps'.//- .dropbox.co* s+ 7n96qeg1 kgsw3/2022DA20Ca1l'fo> 1'a0A20Stop0A20Soc1'a10A20M ed1'
aolzocensorshl'polzoAct.pdodl=o
6. Colorado. To be introduced by Rep. W illinms at the 2022 legislative session as follows:
hûpsr//- .dropbox.coe s/tcc7u ddoqwgs6f/zozz%zocolorado%zostop%zosocialbzoM edia
%20CensorsEp%20Act%20Fina1.pd0d1=0
7. Connecticut. To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hdps://- ./oobox.coe s/db4xv7ohcusl'4l'o/zozz%zocoM ecticut%zostop%zosocial%zoMed
ia%20CensorsEn%20Act%20Fm AL%20W ENDED.pdOdl=0
8. Delaware. To be introduced by Sen. Richardson (R) at the 2022 legislative session:
h=ps'.//- .dropbox.co* s/0x3ayrs6964v 9&20220/a20De1awre0/o20Stop0A20Social0A20M edia
%zocensorship%zoAct.pdodl=o
9. Florida. H'R 33 sponsored by Rep. Sabatini (R) - provided by De Facto Attomeys General -
at the 2021 legislative session :
hdos://1eeisc= .co* L+ i1O 0033/2021
To be introduced at the 2022 legislative session as follows:
hdps'./- .dropbox.com/s+65ug= s2n;48F20220A20F1orl'da0A20Stop0A20Soc1'a10A20Med1'a0A
20Censorsh1'pDA20Act0A20AM ENDED.pdOdl=0
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11. Hawaii. 58357 sponsored by Sen. Gabbard (D) - provided by De Facto Attorneys General
- at the 2021 legislative session:
h=ps://1e2isc= .co* 1/texVSB357/2021
To be introduced at the 2022 legislative session by Sen. Gabbard as follows:
htps.//- .dropbox.coW s/4dp0d1< kp4ga&2022D%20Hawa1'1'B%20Stop0A20Soc1'a1BA20M ed1'a0A
20Censorsh1'p0%20Act0%200%2810%29.pdOd1=0
12. Idaho. H0323 sponsored by Rep. Nichols (R) - provided by De Facto Attorneys General -
at the 2021 legislative session:
h=ps://1eeisc= .coM D/texG 0323/2021
To be introduced at the 2022 legislative session by Rep. Nichols as follows:
hûos://- .&oobox.co* s/5m97v1mDdrs36c:/2022%20ldaho%20StoD%20Socia1%20M edia%
zocensorship%zoAct.pdodl=o
13. Illinois. Drafted as follows for the 2022 legislative session:
hdps.//- .dropbox.coO s/mn4sxp14r4h2ki2022B/ô20I1linoisDA20Stop0/a20Social0/a20M edia0/a2
ocensorship.pdodl=o
14. Indiana: To be introduced at the 2022 legislative session by Rep. Jacobs as follows:
hlps://- .dropbox.coe s/laea6ssvko3l'sll'/zozz%zolndir a%zostop%zosocial%zoM edia%zo
CensorshiotlzoAct%zo.ododl=o
15. Iowa. HF171 sponsored by Rep. Salmon - provided by De Facto Attorneys General - at the
2021 legislative session:
hdps'.//legl'scan.coM N texG Fl7l/zozl
To be introduced at the 2022 legislative session by Rep. Salmon as follows:
h=ps://- .dropbox.co* s/66e8he2cd0> s1'4/2022%20Iowa%20Stop%20Social%20M edia%20
Censorship% 20Act% 20AM ENDED .ndO d1=0
16. Kansas. 1182322 sponsored by Rep. Gaber (R) - provided by De Facto Attomeys General.
To be inkoduced by Rep. Garber at the 2022 legislative session as follows:
hûps://- .dropbox.coe s/6dxnzcgz-lr67olzozz%zoKr sas%zostoo%zosocial%zoM ediabz
ocensorshl'poAzoAct.pdodl=o
17. Kentucky. SB 411 sponsored by Sen. M ills (R) - provided by De Facto Attorneys General -
at the 2021 legislative session:
hlpsl//legiscr .coG Y/texvsBlll/zozl
To be introduced at the 2022 legislative session by Sen. M ills as follows:
htps://- ./oobox.coe s/tlr4kccal lelvc/zozz%zoKenmcW %zostoo%zosocial%zoM edia%
20Censorshio%20Act%20%281%29.pdOd1=0
18. Louisiana. SB196 sponsored by Sen. M orris (R) - provided by De Facto Attomeys
General - at the 2021 legislative session:
https:/fegiscan.com& Y text/sBlg6/zozl
To be introduced at the 2022 legislative session by Sen. M onis as follows:
hdps://- .dropbox.co* s/o0qiu7nout6np6< ouisi= a-2021-SB196-Engrossed%20%283%29.
ododl=o




19. Maine. LD1609 sponsored by Rep. Sampson (R) - provided by De Facto Attorneys
General - at the 2021 legislative session:
hdos://1e2isc= .co> /texA D1609/2021
To be introduced at the 2022 legislative session by Rep. Snmpson as follows:
hdps'.//- .dropbox.coe s/xl'l'zkpbtktkWsf/zozzBAzoM al'neoAzostopoAzosocl'alnAzoM edl'aoAzo
CensorshipolzoActpdodl=o
20. M aryland. HB1314 sponsored by Del.Adams (R) - provided by De Facto Attonwys
General - at the 2021 legislative session:
httns://leeiscan.co /text/HB1314/2021
To be inkoduced at the 2022 legislative session by Del. Adnms as follows:
h=os://- .&oobox.co* s/nsM91's3dBn n5/2022%20M o 1= d%20StoD%20Socia1%20M edia
lzocensorsllio%zoActpdodl=o
21. M assachusetts. To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hlps'.//- .dropbox.coY s/v zubrqeoseA6bzozznAzoM assachusedseAzostopBlzosocialoAzoM
ediao/ozocensorshipBlzoAct.pdp.dl=o
22. M ichigan. To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
h=Ds://- .droobox.co* s/n31nn0uw23re37W2022%20M ichig= %20Stoo%20Socia1%20M edia
%zocensorsEo%zoAct%zoFinal%zonmendment.ododl=o
23. Minnesota. To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legtslative session:
h=ps://- .&opbox.co* s/7> 9qv81'> 48aV2022%20M 1'nneso<%20StoD%20Socia1%20M edia
BAzocensorshl'poAzoActoAzoAmendedolzolnal.pdodl=o
24. M ississippi: SB 2617 sponsored by Sen. Hil (R) - provided by De Facto Attorneys
General - at the 2021 legislative session:
h=ps://legisc= .coA S/texVSB2617/2021
To be inkoduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hûps://- .dropbox.coe s/- l'n7er sb37oawN ississiooi%zostoo%zosocial%zoM edia%zoc
ensorship%zoActpdodl=o
25. Missouri. HB 482 sponsored by Rep. Coldman (R) - provided by De Facto Attomeys
General - at the 2021 legislative session:
hûps://1egisc> .coA O+i1O B482/2021
To be inkoduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hlos://- .&oobox.co* s/2h1'5e2vlyro8m39/2022%20M issoM %20Stoo%20Socia1%2
-0-M- -e-dia
%zocensorship% zoAct.ndodl=o
26. M ontana. To be inkoduced as follows at the 2023 legislativc session:
- --phtt s://- .dropbox.co* s/q> z360QdA04i2023%20M ONTM A%20STOP%20SOC1M % 2
OM EDIABAZOCEN SORSY POAZOACTBAZOAM ENDEDOAZOFW M .PdOdI=O
27. Nebraska. LB621 sponsored by Sen. Curt Friesen (R) - provided by De Facto Attorneys
General - at the 2021 legislative session:
hûos://1eqisc= .co* E/texA B621/2021
To be introduced as follows at the 2023 legislative session:




hûps://- .&oobox.co* s/4s6w-s-k- o-5-dw9su1'4/2-0-22% -2- 0Nebraska%20%20Stop%20Socia1%20
M ediabzocensorshio%zoAct%zoFm AL.pdodl=o
28. Nevada: To be inkoduced as follows at the 2023 legislativetsession:
29. New Hampshire. HB133 sponsored by Rep. Plett (R) - provided by De Facto Attorneys
General - at the 2021 legislative session:
hdps'.//1eg1'scan.co* H/texO 133/2021
To be inkoduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hlps://- ./opbox.coe s+ilwhnhl'f4cRuvzozz%zoNeeAzoHnmpsMre%zostop%zosocial
%zoM edia%zocensorsMp%zoAct.odpdl=o
30. New Jersey. A578 sponsored by Asm-Auth - provided by De Facto Attorneys General - at
the 2021 legislative session:
h% s://1eaisc= .co* J/texVA578/2020
To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hdps'.//- .dropbox.coe s/pkzwqtqx8mN J'bN ee AzolerseyB/ozostopoAzosocizBAzoM ediaoA
zocensorshipo/azoAct.pdp.dl=o
31. New M exico. To be inkoduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hûps://- .&oobox.coY s/3n'% o4547t:1w /2022%20Ne< A20M exico%20Stop%20Socia1%20
M edia%20CensorsEo%20Act%20O NDED.odOd1=0
32. New Yqrk- To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hdos://- .&opbox.co* s/âeto> R> 7108F2022%20New%20York%20Stoo%20Social%20M
ed1'a0A20Censorsh1'p0%20Act0%20FlNAL0%20AMEr ED0A20.pdOd1=0
33. North Carolina. 5497 sponsored by Sen. Alexander - provided by De Facto Attomeys
General - at the 2021 legislative session:
h=ps://1egisc> .co* C/teY S497/2021
34. North Dakota. 1K 1144 sponsored by Rep. Kading. - provided by Professor Hnmburger-
at the 2021 legislative session:
h=os://1e2isc= .co* D/te* 1144/2021
To be inkoduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session by Rep. Jones:
h% s'.//- .dropbox.co* s/1'< 5b1eyv?'82ws1'/2022BA20Nodh0A20DA o>0%20StopB%20Soc1'al0A2
OM edia%zocensorship%zoAct.pdodl=o
35. Ohio. To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
h> s://- .&oobox.coY s/vzid2z6z80eer4/2022%20N-e-w%20Ohio%20Ston%20Social%20M e
dia%zocensorshio%zoAct%zoFiM l.ododl=o
36. Oklahoma. 58383 sponsored by Sen. Standridge - provided by De Facto Attorneys
General - at the 2021 legislative session:
hûps'.//1eg1'scan.co* OU texFSB383/2021
To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hûps://- .&opbox.co* s/150i8fe4z7q= b/2022%20Ok1A omaB/c20Stop-%20Socia1%20M edi
a% 20CensorsM o-%20Act%20Fm M %20O NDED.DdOd1=0
37. Oregon. Tö be inkoduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session by Rep. Leif:
! j
ij, jy u. t'; .
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hûns://- .droobox.coO s/4k0sm41'5o0iub68/2022%20Oreeon%20Stoo%20Socia1%20M edia%-
20Censorship%20Act%20Fm M %20O NDED.pdOd1=0
38. Pennsylvania. SB604 sponsored by Sen. M astriano - provided by De Facto Atlorneys
General - at the 2021 legislative session:
h=ps'.//1eg1'scan.com9Y texFSB604/2021
39. Rhode Island. H5564 sponsored by Vella-W ilkinson (D) - provided by De Facto
Attorneys General - at the 2021 legislative session:
hdos://- .&opbox.co* sH 11ybi10bçk8/2022%20M ode%20Is1= d%20Stoo%20Social%2-
OM edia%zocensorshio.pdodl=o
40. South Carolina. 113450 sponsored by Rep. Burns (R) - provided by De Facto Attorneys
General - at the 2021 legislative session:
hdps://le:isc= .co* SC/teM 3450/2021
To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
h=ps.//- .dropbox.co* s/73d6& l1h< 204V20220/a20South%20Cro1ina0A20Stop0A20Socia1
0A20M edia0/a20Censorship0A20Act0A20Conso1idated0%200A2820/o29.pdOdl=0.
41. South Dakota. 1181223 sponsored by Rep. Jensen - provided by De Facto Attorneys
General - at the 2021 legislative session:
https://1egisc= .co* SD+i1O B1223/2021
To be inkoduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hûps://- .&opbox.co* s/7bnc81'<50hhzbè2022%20South%20DA o>%20Stop%20Socia1%2
-
OM edl'aolzocensorshl'poAzoAct.pdodl=o
42. Tennessee. To be inkoduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
https://- .dropbox.coe s/ylrlbiuJ'fsawlep/zozzbzoTeM esseebzostop%zosocial%zoM edia
%20CensorsMp%20bill%200859%20nmended%20FINAL% 20.pd0d1=0
43. Texas. SB12 sponsored by Sen. Hughes - provided by De Facto Attorneys General - at the
2021 legislative session:
hûos:-//- .dropbox.coe s/uper wsuspn6ec/zozzbzoTexas%zostoobzosocial%zoM ediab-z
Ocensorshl'poAzoAct.pdodl=o
44. Utah. 58228 sponsore'd by Sen. M cKell - provided by De Fado Attorneys General - at the
2021 legislative session:
hûps://legisc= .co< T/texVSB0228/2021
To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hdDs://- .&oobox.co* s/6a 60b2igd5xD* 2022%20Utah%20Stoo%20Socia1%20M edia% 2
-0
CensorsMo%20Act%20W ENDED%20FW AL.odOd1=0
45. Verm ont. To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hdps'./- .dropbox.coe sA x6oksugolle zozloAzove= ontoAzostopDAzosocl'aloAzoMedl'a
0/a20Censorship0/c20Act0/c20Fm AL0/o20.pdF. d1=0
46. Virginia. To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session by Delegate Byron:
hûos://- ./ opbox.coe s/M bibggoegr6st3/zozz% zovirqinia% zostop% zosocial% zoM edia%
20Censorship%20Act%20%281%29.pdOd1=0
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47. W ashington. To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hlps://- .droobox.coe s/x3tie83nsl'dkop/zozz%zoWashineton%zostop%zosocialbzoM edi
a% 20CensorsE o% 20Act% 20Fm M .odOd1=0
48. W est Virginia. To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session by Sen Azinger:
htpg.//- .dropbox.coe s/6t/mzoM wsl'gl'/WestoAzovl'rgl'nl'aolzostopoAzosocl'alolzoMedl'aol
zocensorshl'polzoAct.pdF.dl=o
49. W isconsin. To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hlps://- .dropbox.coo s/pt8vggsuw- birl'el/zozz%zoW isconsin%zostop%zosocial%zoM edia
%zocensorship%zoAct.pdodl=o
50. W yoming. SF0100 sponsored by Sen. Steinm etz - provided by Professor Hamburger- at
the 2021 legislative session:
https://leciscan.co /texVSF0100/iJ2339364/Wvomina-2021-SF0100-En2rossed.pdf
To be introduced as follows at the 2022 legislative session:
hûps.//- .dropbox.co* s/mdr58> 4wsuvh91/20220A20W yoming0/a20Stop0/a20Socia10/a20M e
dia%zocensorshin%zoAct.pdodl=o
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APPENDW  B
The Amended version of HB 33 - the Stop Social M edia Censorship Act For Florida
L I H O F P R E S E N T
HB 2022
A bill to be entitled
An act relating to social media websites; providing a short title;
providing definitions; providing that the owner or operator of a
social media website is subject to a private right of action by
certain social media website users in this state under certain
conditions; providing for damages; authorizing the award of
reasonable attorney fees and costs; prohibiting a social media
website from using hate speech as a defense; authorizing the Attorney
General to bring an action on behalf of social media website users;
providing exceptions for the deletion or censorship of certain types
speech; provides for fines by secretary of state; provides for
severability; providing an effective date.
WHEREAS, the Communications Decency Act was created
protect decent speech, not deceptive trade practices, and
WHEREAS, repealing section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act at the federal level is unnecessary because it
already includes a state-law exemption and the Stop Social Media
Censorship Act was crafted squarely in the state-law
exemption of section 230 to cure abuses of section 230 to
protect the consumers of this state, and
WHEREAS, contract law is a state-law issue, and when
citizen of state signs up use certain social media
websites, they are entering into a contract, and
WHEREAS, this state has a compelling interest holding
certain social media websites to higher standards for having
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substantially created a digital public square through fraud,
false advertising, and deceptive trade practices, and
WHEREAS, major social media websites have engaged in the
greatest bait and switch of all times by marketing themselves as
free, fair, and open to ideas to induce subscribers only to
then prove otherwise at great expense to consumers and election
integrity, and
WHEREAS, breach of contract, false advertising, bad faith,
unfair dealing, fraudulent inducement, and deceptive trade
practices are not protected forms of speech for purpose of the
first amendment of the United States Constitution or the
Constitution state, and
WHEREAS, the major social media websites have already
reached critical mass, and they did through fraud, false
advertising, and deceptive trade practices at great expense
the health, safety, and welfare of consumers of this state,
while making it difficult for others compete with them, and
WHEREAS, the state has an interest helping its citizens
enjoy their free exercise rights certain semi-public forums
commonly used for religious and political speech, regardless
which political party or religious organization they ascribe to
,
and
WHEREAS, this state is generally opposed to online
censorship unless the content is injurious to children
promotes human trafficking; only then does this state accept
limited censorship, and
WHEREAS, this act is not intended to apply a website
merely deletes comments posted by members of the general
public in response to material published by the website's owner,
NOW THEREFORE,
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
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Section 1. This act mav be cited as the ''Stoo Social Media
Censorship Act.''
Section This section is intended to create a statute
that oarallels the soirit of 47 U.S.C. $ 230 that falls within
the state 1aw exemption under 47 U .S.C. ; 230/e143) and create a
civil richt of action that Will deter the followinq:
(1) Deceotive trade practices;
(2) False advertisinc;
(3) Breach of contract;
(4) Bad faith;
(5) Unfair dealinc;
(6) Fraudulent inducement; and
(7! The stifling of political and religious speech in the
modern-dav dicital Dublic scuare cultivated bv social media
websites that have achieved critical mass through fraud.
Section
oenalties.-
Social media website speech; cause of action;
(1) As used in this section. the term :
(a) ''Alcorithm' means a set of instructions desicned to
perform a specific task.
(b) ''Hate soeech'' means a rhrase concernin? content that
an individual finds offensive based on his or her personal moral
code .
(c) 'Obscenen means that an averace rersone arplvin?
contemrorary communitv standards. would find that. taken as a
whole, the dominant theme of the material arreals to prurient
interests.
(d! 'Political speech'' means speech relating to the state,
covernment, bodv oolitic, or rublic administration as it relates
to covernmental Dolicvmakinc. The term includes speech by the
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covernment or a candidate for office and anv discussion of
social issues. The term does not include speech concerning the
administration, law, or civil aspects of covernment.
(e) 'Relicious soeechn means a set of unrroven answers,
. 
'
truth claims, faith-based assumptions. and naked assertions that
attemot to exrlain such creater cuestions created. what .
constitutes richt and wronc what happens after death.
(f) 'Social media website'':
1. Means an Internet website or arrlication that enables
users to communicate with each other by posting information.
comments, messaces, or imaces and that meets a11 of the
followinc recuirements:
i. Ts open to the public.
ii. Has more than 75 million subscribers with rersonal
user profiles.
iii. From its inceotion. has not been srecificallv
affiliated with anv one relicion or rolitical party.
iv. Provides a means for the website 's users to report
obscene materials and has in rlace rrocedures for evaluatin?
those reports and removing obscene material; and
v. Allows for subscribers to sicn up for a Dersonal user
profile oaqe or account where beliefs and rreferences can be
expressed by the user.
2. The term does not include a website that merelv rermits
b f the ceneral public to post comments on contentmem ers o
published bv the owner of the website.
(c) ''User Drofile'' means a collection of settincs and
information associated with a user or subscriber who signs up
for an account made available bv a social media website. Such
accounts often include the exrlicit dicital representation of
the identitv of the user or subscriber with respect to the
oreratinc environment of a social media website. Such accounts
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often associate characteristics with a user or subscriber, which
may helo in ascertaining the interactive behavior of the user
alonc with their personal preferences and beliefs.
(2)(ah The owner or ooerator of a social media website who
contracts with a social media website user in this state is
subn'ect to a Drivate richt of action bv such user if the social
media website ourposelv:
1. Deletes or censors the user's reliqious speech or
Dolitical sreech; or
2. Uses an algorithm to disfavor or censure the user's
relicious speech or Dolitical sreech.
(b) A social media website user may be awarded a1l of the
following damages under this section:
1. Uo to $75.000 in statutorv damaces.
2. Actual damages.
3. If accravatinc factors are Dresent, runitive damaces.
4. Other forms of ecuitable relief.
(c! The prevailing party in a cause of action under this
iion mav be awarded costs and reasonable attornev fees.sec
(d) A social media website that restores from deletion or
removes Ehe censorinq of a social media website user's speech in
a reasonable amount of time may use that fact to miticate anv
damages.
(3) A social media website mav not use the social media
website user's alleged hate sreech as a basis for qustification
or defense of the social media websitels actions at trial.
(4) The Attornev General mav also brinc a civil cause of
action under this section on behalf of a social media website
user who resides in this state and whose relicious sreech or
rolitical soeech has been censored by a social media website .
(5) This section does not arplv to anv of the followinc:
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(a) A social media website that deletes or censors a
social media website user's soeech or that uses an alcorithm to
disfavor or censure speech that:
1. Calls for immediate acts of violence;
2. Is obscene. lewd, lascivious. filthy or pornographic in
nature;
3. Is the result of ooerational error;
4. Is the result of a court order;
5. Comes from an inauthentic source or involves false
% .
6. Entices criminal conduct;
7. Involves minors bullvinc minors;
8. Constitutes trademark or copyright infringement;
9. Is excessivelv violent; and
10. Constitutes harassinc spam of the commercial. not
relicious or rolitical, nature.
(b) A social media website user's censorin? of another
social media website user 's soeech .
(6) Only users who are 18 years of age or older have
standinc to seek enforcement of this section.
Section 4. The Secretarv of State mav:
(1! Tssue a fine in one of the following amounts if the
Secretarv of State finds that the social media website has
engaged in deolatforminc or shadowbanninc a nolitical candidate
seekinc office in Connecticut in violation of this act:
(a) If the candidate is seekinc Statewide office. up to
S100.000 per day of the violation;
(b) For all other candidates. ur to $10,000 rer dav of the
violation; and
(2) Disclose a social media companv's alcorithmic bias for
or acainst a oolitical candidate seekinc Statewide office under
subsection (1! of this section as a campaign contributian.
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Section If anv section in this act or anv rart of anv
section is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the declaration
shall not affect the validitv or constitutionalitv of the
remaininc oortions.
Section 6. This act shall take effect July 1, 2021.
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